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The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the strategic and organisational 
configurations that companies can use to generate value with product-market systems and their busi-
ness models that have been dominant in the past but forced back into niche positions by innovation.
The former dominant music format vinyl was rapidly substituted after the introduction of digital music. 
However, still nowadays some customers use and buy old technology-based products – vinyl sales boom 
again since 2007. Due to the two-sided nature of the market, customers have to get access to comple-
mentary goods. We are thus interested in technologies which have been outdated by the emergence of 
new technologies. The originality lies in the combination of the two areas: business models and old tech-
nologies. Furthermore, vinyl is an example not analysed in depth by scholars so far.
We approached this by undertaking an in-depth literature review to generate hypotheses regarding the 
value-adding activities of old-technology based businesses as a basis for further research in this area. In 
addition the paper gives first insights into the constellations to be expected over time for old technology-
based businesses models in platform markets.
We here focus on a neglected topic in the strategy literature which, however, bears relevance for many 
businesses locked into product-market systems which make it hard for them to (completely) switch to a 
new technology emerging in the market. It is especially valuable to describe the consequences in a sys-
tematic fashion.
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Introduction: 
Can old technologies create value?
In the strategy field implications of a dynamically 
changing environment are widely researched: Innova-
tive technologies in new and quickly changing markets 
are the drivers to investigate questions of efficient and 
effective organisational forms and relevant underlying 
resources and/or capabilities (e.g., Bosch et al., 1999; 
Chatterjee, 2013; Ismail et al., 2014). Such organisa-
tional forms may include market-related, cooperative 
and hierarchical elements. In more established mar-
ketplaces similar questions stay relevant with the in-
dustry going through the more mature phases of the 
lifecycle (e.g., McDermott et al., 2013, p. 3). Technologi-
cal change greatly affects the structures of industries 
(Schumpeter, 1942) and therefore is also suggested to 
impact business models and related exchange part-
ners. 
As soon as an industry context is on the decline due 
to the emergence of a revolutionary new technology, 
management research seems to somewhat lose inter-
est, at least in business models which are locked into 
the production and/ or distribution of the outdated 
product (for exceptions see Cooper and Schendel, 1976; 
Adner and Snow 2010). At the same time it can be ob-
served that usually some firms in declining industries 
(e.g., analogous photography, typewriters, mechanical 
watches and vinyl records) go on to exist with the old 
product focus for a relatively long time span after it is 
clear that new technologies would make the sustain-
ability of the success at least highly questionable. Un-
derstanding how businesses may be able to create as 
much value as possible in a declining industry context 
in which they are locked into by their product-system-
specific investments thus is an interesting and relevant 
question. 
The research deficit sketched is the point of reference 
for this paper and the emerging literature on busi-
ness models (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2012; Teece, 2010; 
Zott and Amit, 2013; Yrjölä, 2014; Ahokangas and Myl-
lykoski, 2014; Lund and Nielsen, 2014) is suggested to 
deliver fruitful input. Based on the work of Afuah and 
Tucci (2001), Osterwalder et al. (2005) and Zott et al. 
(2011), Massa and Tucci suggest to conceptualize busi-
ness models broadly “as depicting the rationale of how 
an organization (a firm or other type of organization) 
creates, delivers, and captures value (economic, social, 
or other forms of value) in relationship with a net-
work of exchange partners” (Massa and Tucci, 2014, p. 
423). This understanding of business models – as one 
among a vast number of existing business model defi-
nitions (Ahokangas and Myllykoski, 2014) – guides us 
in this paper. Value creation by old technology driven 
players requires a long-term perspective. Since “[b]usi-
ness model choices define the architecture of the busi-
ness, and expansion paths develop from there on out” 
(Teece, 2010, p. 181) a certain path dependency has to 
be taken into account: This on the one hand side can 
form an isolating mechanism against competitors, on 
the other hand, however, it also may lock a focal player 
into a particular structure hard to change after once 
being established (Teece, 2010). Thus, it is interesting 
to investigate if and how business models in a certain 
market change after revolutionary technological inno-
vations. While Teece (2010) wants to investigate how 
business models bring firms in a position to capture 
value from technological innovation, this article ad-
dresses the issue of value creation and appropriation 
of old technology-based firms. 
We use one aspect of the broad concept of business 
models here: Value creation architectures (VCA). In 
this paper we understand value creation architectures 
as “the structure and relationships of all the value-
adding activities that are carried out by various actors 
and companies to bring a particular product or service 
to market” (Dietl et al., 2009, p. 26). VCA thus can be 
understood as a specification of the broad concept of a 
business model, which leads to a more in-depth under-
standing of how value creation is embedded into dif-
ferent intra- and inter-firm organisational structures. 
Over the last decades a trend towards disintegrated 
value chains could be observed in many industry con-
texts (McDermott et al., 2013, p. 1; Lund and Nielsen, 
2014, p. 106) and VCAs can range on a continuum from 
highly disintegrated to very much integrated forms 
with different hybrid/cooperative forms in-between. 
To understand strategic advantages of firms it is not 
sufficient anymore to stop at firm boundaries but a 
functional perspective appears more appropriate to 
compare different value-creating structures compet-
ing in bringing a certain type of product into the mar-
ket. Choosing this perspective enables the inclusion of 
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a loose network of small players into analysis in the 
same way as a large, highly integrated player. We here 
follow the understanding of Sah and Stiglitz (1986, p. 
716) who suggest that the performance of an organisa-
tion should not solely be put in relation to the internal 
structures but that the underlying architecture should 
be taken into account. 
Competitive advantage is rooted in the ability of a firm 
to create customer willingness to pay for a product 
or service. Therefore the offered service or product in 
the marketplace is our starting point. We identify the 
value creation activities necessary to offer the service 
or product to come to an understanding of the VCA. 
The field of strategy delivers the fundament here with 
different conceptualisations of competitive advan-
tage from a resource-oriented (e.g., Peteraf, 1993), a 
dynamic capabilities-based (e.g., Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997) and a relational perspective (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998). The performance of the VCA in the rel-
evant competitive environment can be assessed build-
ing on a market-based perspective (e.g., Porter, 2008) 
complemented by taking further market specificities 
into account: Market contexts where the quality and 
availability of complements is strategically relevant 
became known as platform markets and recently have 
been intensely investigated regarding useful strategy 
and organizational design (e.g., Parker and van Alstyne, 
2014). In the current literature it is in focus how an ac-
tor may be successful in starting a superior product-
market-system in such a two-sided market or remain 
a platform leader (e.g., Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2014; Suarez and Kirtley, 2012; Lund 
and Nielsen, 2014, p. 115-116). The consequences for the 
incumbents in the then inferior product-market sys-
tem (which has been dominant previously) are of less 
interest and thus reflect that a research deficit exists 
here. Incumbents competing with an old technology in 
a platform market are in the focus of this research.
As the areas of business models, value creation archi-
tectures and platform markets are still under develop-
ment, scholars did not pay much attention to date on 
how firms, after technological change, arrange their 
value creation activities to support the survival of an 
old declining product. However, it is not uncommon to 
see old technological products (for instance, analogue 
cameras and turntables or also mechanical watches) 
that, even after the rise of a new superior technology, 
survive for very long time and go on generating value 
for some firms. However, the inner “creative destruc-
tion” of technological change (Schumpeter, 1942) will 
be likely to lead firms to modify the traditional imple-
mentation of their business processes, for example 
in terms of integration and/or disintegration. Various 
scholars analysed the strategic reactions of established 
companies to technological change (Cooper and Smith, 
1992; Adner and Snow, 2010; Schiavone, 2011; Schi-
avone and Borzillo, 2014). Great emphasis was given to 
the reasons leading firms to failure (Christensen, 1997). 
Conversely, scarce attention was paid to the evolution 
of VCA (as a specification of business models) of in-
cumbent firms after new technology emerges and their 
products suddenly became old and obsolete. Therefore, 
the core research question of this study is:
 
How do companies (re-) design their value creation ar-
chitectures for old technology-based products where de-
mand declined after technological change?
The article is organised as follows: The next sec-
tion reviews the main literature about VCAs and the 
strategizing of old technology-based companies after 
technological change in order to form the conceptual 
fundament for the study. Implications of the existence 
of complete product-market systems that became old 
fashioned are taken into account. The third section de-
scribes propositions for future research in this area and 
illustrates in some detail possible research strategies 
to investigate this further. The fourth section summa-
rises the main conclusions. To come to fruitful avenues 
for future research, considerations are developed for a 
case-based analysis of remaining players in the vinyl 
industry as one prominent example of old technology.
Towards a useful conceptualisation: 
Competitive advantage, value crea-
tion architectures and old technolo-
gy-based firms
The following sections highlight core findings of the 
literature regarding competitive advantage realisation 
of different VCAs as well as the effects of technologi-
cal changes on old-technology-based businesses. The 
literature review results in a conceptual fundament for 
further investigations.
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Value creation architectures and competitive 
advantage
Creating value for the customers is central for firms in 
order to generate returns for the firm owners (Porter, 
1996; Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2001). The fundamen-
tal question in the field of strategy is how do firms 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage (Royer, 
2005). “Strategic management, in both theory and 
practice, tries to understand how firms may improve 
their performance in competitive interactions with 
other firms” (Sanchez and Heene, 1997, p. 303). Strate-
gic management thus wants to understand why some 
firms perform better than others with regard to this 
objective. 
Performance in terms of competitive advantage re-
alisation in the economic strategic management ap-
proaches is conceptualised in different types of rents: 
Firms may earn monopolistic rents on the basis of posi-
tioning strategies in imperfect markets (Porter, 1980). 
Taking into account resource heterogeneity, Ricardian 
rents accrue from the possession of scarce resources 
(Peteraf, 1993). While such Ricardian rents may lead to 
sustainable competitive advantage, Schumpeterian or 
entrepreneurial rents (Teece et al., 1997) rather imply 
temporary advantage. Firms realise them on the basis 
of certain capabilities and through risk taking and en-
trepreneurial insights in an uncertain or complex envi-
ronment. Over time the underlying capabilities diffuse 
into the market and become best practice. In coopera-
tive ventures relationship-specific assets, knowledge-
sharing routines, complementary resources and capa-
bilities as well as effective governance may generate 
relational rents for the partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Especially the recent developments in the strategy lit-
erature regarding relational rent generation highlight 
that it is acknowledged that an internal firm analysis 
is not sufficient for understanding strategic opportu-
nities (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006). It also has 
to be understood where cooperative core competencies 
(Duschek, 2004) or network resources (Gulati, 1999) 
may be used to generate competitive advantage. Iso-
lating mechanisms such as causal ambiguity (Dierickx 
and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991), inter-organisational asset 
interconnectedness, scarcity of partners, indivisibility 
of resources and certain institutional environments are 
suggested to protect such relational rents against imi-
tation (Dyer and Singh, 1998, p. 672). However, coop-
eration partners may also face a danger in what Lavie 
(2006, p. 647) calls spillover rents. Such rents may be 
generated by one partner in an opportunistic fashion 
on the basis of network resources.
On the basis of the strategy literature with economic 
roots we want to take into account competitive ad-
vantage generated on the basis of network resources 
as well as firm-internal resources and capabilities. 
We do extent our perspective beyond firm boundaries 
and focus on a VCA competing in a certain market to 
bring a particular product or service to the customer 
(Dietl et al., 2009). “[T]emplates that emerge in a sec-
tor and circumscribe the division of labor among a set 
of co-specialized firms” are called industry architec-
tures (Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier, 2006, p. 1201). 
Since we assume different architectures in the same 
industry context, we here use the term VCA and sug-
gest that different degrees of (dis)integration compete 
against each other in the same market. Findings from 
case studies of the European automotive industry back 
this view (see Dietl et al., 2009 and Stratmann, 2010). 
Two levels of competition become relevant for our 
analysis: (1) the competition between different VCAs 
(inter-architecture competition) and (2) the competi-
tion between the actors in the same VCA to appropri-
ate a high share of the resulting rents within that par-
ticular system (intra-architecture competition). Figure 
1 summarises the VCA approach we are using for this 
analysis.
Thereafter the analysis of VCAs deals with the level of 
integration in production (production depth and pro-
duction control) and the level of integration of distribu-
tion (distribution depth and distribution control). Both, 
the choice of a certain level of depth of production and 
distribution, can lead to value creation and competitive 
advantage of the focal actor at the intra- and inter-
architectural level (Dietl et al., 2009). Hence different 
VCAs can have significantly different characteristics 
which are, as an extension of Coase’s (1937) differen-
tiation of internal production and the use of the market 
and the transaction cost economics’ view by William-
son (1985), grouped in three distinct generic categories: 
Integrated, disintegrated and quasi-integrated forms 
of VCAs. 
Referring to Figure 1 ‘integrated’ means a high level of 
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Figure 11: Conceptual framework linking value creation architectures with competitive advantage
production and distribution depth. On the other side of 
this continuum disintegrated VCAs can be found: this 
form is characterised by a low level of production and 
distribution depth and therewith the usage of markets 
to procure inputs (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006; Dietl et 
al., 2009). In between mixed forms can be found which 
are characterised by low production and distribution 
depth combined with a certain level of control and co-
ordination for the other actors of the same VCA. Such 
control and coordination mechanism may include self-
enforcing safeguards (e.g., trust or hostages) and third-
party safeguards (e.g., legal contracts) and potentially 
generate relational rents (Dyer and Singh, 1998). When 
we use the term ‘control’ here, we are interested in 
how close the focal actors’ relationships with external 
partners via formal and/or informal mechanisms are.
Product innovations often are not sufficient for gain-
ing competitive advantage as competitors are in many 
cases quickly able to copy these (Cliffe, 2011; Matzler 
et al., 2013). Hence VCA innovation (as part of BM in-
novation) is an opportunity to build sustainable com-
petitive advantage (Teece, 2010). This can be achieved 
if customer value increases and a new value creation 
and revenue model gets established so that a new way 
of value appropriation is possible (Matzler et al., 2013). 
For multinational corporations, for example, it is in a 
fast changing global environment suggested to be im-
portant to repeatedly re-evaluate and reconfigure their 
value chains to gain competitive advantage and to stay 
ahead of the competitors (Maitland and Sammartino, 
2012).
The American computer manufacturer IBM at a certain 
time had valuable resources and excellent capabilities 
to build PCs and hence was able to create great value 
with its PC business. Looking at a distinction made by 
Gawer and Cusumano (2014) who suggest to differen-
tiate between different types of platforms in terms of 
internal (firm or product) platforms as well as external 
(industry) platforms one may say that IBM was even 
able to establish their product as an industry platform 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2014, pp. 417). However, their 
value creation architecture put suppliers such as Micro-
soft and Intel into such strong positions that the focal 
player of the VCA, IBM, failed to appropriate the value 
created and to build a long-term competitive advan-
tage in this field and industry/architectural leadership 
in the 1980s shifted to Intel and Microsoft (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014, pp. 423). The example shows the im-
portance of the design of VCAs and the link to com-
petitive advantage. Questions of how to find a balance 
between competition and cooperation thus seem to be 
highly relevant, especially in areas where we have dy-
namic technological change. 
However, what about old-technology-based industries 
such as the vinyl pressing industry? Here, the environ-
ment seems to be more stable making a vertically in-
tegrated structure more likely to lead to benefits (Mc-
Dermott, 2013, p. 3). Comparing e.g. the vinyl pressing 
industry with other audio segments such as CDs, the 
sales numbers are relatively small, yet increasing. The 
number of players still in the market thus also can be 
assumed to be declining. This decline leads – next to 
other implications – to a lack of potential cooperation 
partners on a horizontal as well as vertical level.
On the basis of this reasoning we assume that firm 
1: Source: Dietl et al., 2009, p. 31.
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internal resources play a central role in old technology 
(niche) markets as for example the vinyl industry to 
come into a position to generate competitive advan-
tage. The relevance of shared and network resources 
may be lower. The underlying reasoning is that a rela-
tively integrated VCA would be beneficial in old tech-
nology markets while a disintegrated structure may be 
favourable in new technology contexts. When analys-
ing old technology VCAs, the aspect of competition be-
tween rivalling VCAs (inter-architecture competition) 
thus is more in our focus than competition and com-
petitive advantage realisation in a single VCA (intra-
architecture competition).
Old technology-based firms after technological 
change
A review of the literature about the main strategic re-
actions of incumbent firms during or after technologi-
cal change outlines different behaviours for preserving 
and/or renewing their VCAs. Adner and Snow (2010a) 
analyse old technology firms that do not want to exit 
from the market or switch to a new technology. This 
strategy of maintaining the focus on the old technol-
ogy implies the creation of “coexistence between obso-
lete and superior technologies” (De Liso and Filatrella, 
2008, p. 593). In this context it can be differentiated 
between mainly two strategies called racing and re-
treat strategies. 
A racing strategy implies that firms behave in a way 
that is sometimes labelled as the sailing ship effect 
(Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Gilfillan, 1935; De Liso and 
Filatrella, 2008 and 2011; Liesenkötter and Schewe, 
2013; for a critical perspective see Howells, 2002 and 
Mendoca, 2013). The key element of this reaction is the 
improvement of the performance and the characteris-
tics of old-technology – the companies hence continue 
to invest in the old technology and “technologies dif-
fuse slowly” (Chari and Hopenhayn, 1991, p. 1161). Gil-
fillan (1935) shaped the term sailing ship effect when 
he described how the sailing ship was heavily improved 
as soon as the steam ships emerged during the 19th 
century (Gilfillan, 1935, pp. 156).
The model of competing technology S curves goes back 
to Foster (1986, pp. 101). Figure 2 shows an established, 
now old, technology (TO) that has secured its position 
over other available technologies (TOX) and from a cer-
tain time on was confronted with a new technology 
(TN) with a technology which was superior from time t* 
on. However, the old technology improved (TO+1) with 
the introduction of the new technology. This effect is a 
“process whereby the advent of a new technology en-
genders a response aimed at improving the incumbent 
technology” (De Liso and Filatrella 2008, p. 593).
The case of sailing ships first described by Gilfillan 
(1935) shows how at the beginning of the 1900s the 
rate of technological innovation of sailing ships, af-
ter the introduction of steam ships, lasted for over 30 
years (since 1850 up to the 1880s) and the period of 
substitution between the two competing technolo-
gies lasted for over 70 years. The sailing ship produc-
ers perceived the steam ships as a threat and, thus, 
improved the performance and innovated their tra-
ditional products: “It is paradoxical, but on exami-
nation logical, that this noble flowering of the sail-
ing ship, this apotheosis during her decline and just 
before extermination, was partly vouchsafed by her 
supplanter, the steamer” (Gilfillan, 1935, pp. 156). 
Some scholars (Howells, 2002 and Mendoca, 2013) ana-
lysed in detail the sailing ship effect and, overall, criti-
cised the conclusions by Gilfillan. The results of their 
studies show that the real existence of this phenom-
enon is questionable. Howells (2002) argues that in 
practice the sailing ship effect is the output of super-
ficial knowledge about the cases analysed. Such mis-
leading view is supported (Howells, 2002, p. 903) by (1) 
the coexistence of apparently substituting technolo-
Figure 22: Scheme of technology competition: The sailing-ship 
effect 
2:Source: Own figure based on Adner and Snow (2010a) and Sandström (2013)
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gies through long periods of time and (2) the confusion 
of continuous innovation in the old technology with in-
novation induced by the threat of substitution.
 
Similarly, the historical analysis by Mendoca (2013) 
shows that the technological competition between 
sailing ships and steam boats was a distortion of what 
really happened. For instance, when new technology 
emerged, sailing ships were already in the most inno-
vative phase of their history and that both technologies 
rather complemented each other even hybrid forms ex-
isted for some time (Mendonca, 2013, p. 1732). However, 
Mendonca also concludes that “the ‘sailing ship effect’ 
may hold true for other industries” (Mendonca, 2013, 
p. 1735). These arguments, however, highlight various 
endemic problems of conceptualisations and empirical 
research about the so-called sailing ship effect. 
Howells (2002) attempts to find proofs for the sailing-
ship effect as one of three possible generic responses 
(exist, switch, sailing-ship effect) to substitution by an-
alysing the two cases of sail and alkali (Howells, 2002, 
p. 887). For these cases Howells could not find strong 
evidence but emphasized the radical notion of change 
of these examples (Howells, 2002, p. 905). Rather oth-
er cases should be analysed (Howells, 2002, p. 905). 
He even describes the most cited source of the sailing-
ship effect, Gilfillan (1935), as misinterpreted: “Not only 
does Gilfillan not make an explicit claim for the ‘sailing-
ship effect’ as private sector phenomenon, he provides 
persuasive evidence that government was the more 
important funding agency […]” (Howells, 2002, p. 892). 
Howells (2002) thus states that switch or exit are the 
dominant strategies for old tech firms. However, there 
is another possibility: stick to the old technology to be 
able to create value from a niche position. 
Despite the real existence of the sailing ship effect is 
hard to clearly identify in the available empirical pat-
terns; this technological concept anyway outlines a 
number of interesting strategic implications when 
companies face technological change:
• Companies have used their R&D efforts and in-
novation resources to analyse/develop both old 
and new technology over the transition phase. 
  
• The emergence of new superior technology re-
shapes the old industry. Differences in reaction by 
users and producers might lead to industry-specific 
strategic and competitive configurations - more 
complex than the classifications by Howells (2002). 
• The destiny of old technologies may be to disap-
pear from the marker in the long term but in the 
short-medium term they can still provide room for 
value creation, niche companies may even be able 
to sustain their competitive position in the long run. 
Another example of technology race between old and 
new technologies is the case of carburettors: With the 
introduction of electronic fuel injection (EFI) the num-
ber of cars sold with carburettors declined sharply by 
1984 whereas the fuel economy (measured in miles 
per gallon, MPG) increased heavily at the same time. 
However, various other industry examples of this phe-
nomenon are provided in the literature (Utterback, 
1994; Snow, 2008), e.g. vacuum tubes vs. transistors, 
steam locomotives vs. diesel-electric, fountain pens 
vs. ball-point pen, fossil fuel power plants vs. nuclear 
power plants, safety razors vs. electric razors, aircraft 
propellers vs. jet engines, leather vs. polyvinyl chlo-
ride plastics (Cooper and Schendel, 1976, p. 64-65). All 
these examples were studied by Cooper and Schendel 
(1976) and they concluded that “[i]n every industry 
studied, the old technology continued to be improved 
and reached its highest stage of technical development 
after the new technology was introduced […]” (Cooper 
and Schendel, 1976, p. 67). 
Furthermore, Cooper and Schendel (1976) found out 
that most firms followed a dual strategy, divided their 
resources and were active in both the new and the old 
technology. Their commitments to the old technol-
ogy stayed substantial. “Perhaps this demonstrates 
the difficulty of changing the patterns of resource al-
location in an established organization” (Cooper and 
Schendel, 1976, pp. 67). Where the old technology con-
tinued growing the companies could keep their com-
petitive and financial advantages especially as the new 
technology firms never entered the old technologies 
market (Cooper and Schendel, 1976, p. 68). In a later 
study Cooper and Smith (1992) studied eight young in-
dustries and 27 firms that were threatened by that new 
technology to analyse the respond strategies, espe-
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cially the case of entering the emerging young industry 
(Cooper and Smith, 1992, pp. 55). The limited number 
of successful examples, however, made it only possible 
to come up with the problems associated with a strat-
egy of participation in the new industry and suggest 
ways how to avoid them rather than to develop success 
formulas (Cooper and Smith, 1992, pp. 67). 
One key point is that it is not the challenge to also in-
troduce the new product but to being able to further 
improve performance, quality and costs which is neces-
sary for the commercial success (which is easier if the 
company has very strong R&D and financial resourc-
es or competition does not yet exist). They also saw 
a tendency of trying to fold the new product into the 
old strategy and were slow in trying out new concepts 
rather than to allow new experimental strategies and 
to carefully analyse the strategies of the new technol-
ogy firms which often have different resources, skills, 
and ideas and do not care about the status quo (Cooper 
and Smith, 1992, pp. 68). 
Technological retreat (Adner and Snow, 2010) is a stra-
tegic approach by which old technology companies re-
trench their products in a niche position within their 
traditional market and/or search for new market appli-
cations (see Figure 3). Hence the goal is not growth and 
expansion but rather survival and contraction which 
is “contrary to traditionally assumed firm objectives” 
(Adner and Snow, 2010, p. 1657).
If an old technology loses the mainstream this does 
not necessarily mean that it loses the entire market. 
Even though it is possible that all customers uniformly 
prefer the new technology, it is a matter of evaluation 
criteria. There exist “several drivers for variance that 
may lead parts of the market to continue to prefer the 
old technology to the new” (Adner and Snow, 2010, p. 
1662). Reasons might be budget constraints, heteroge-
neity of preferences over attribute bundles or emotion-
al/ nostalgic elements of the old technology (Adner 
and Snow, 2010, p. 1662). 
Another reason might be lock-in by an industry which 
Arthur shows on the examples of nuclear-reactor tech-
nology and petrol-versus-steam cars (Arthur, 1989, 
pp. 126.). Farell and Saloner (1986) describe the lock-
in from the customer side: customers who decided to 
adopt a technology that became old through the intro-
duction of a new technology are described as installed 
base that are “somewhat tied to the old technology” 
(Farell and Saloner, 1986, p. 954), also described as 
stranding effect (Farell and Saloner, 1986, p. 941) and 
quite common in platform markets. Liesenkötter and 
Schewe (2013) follow the idea of lock-in of industries 
by combining the concept of path dependency with the 
sailing-ship effect and an analysis of patents for dif-
ferent car engine types to explain why it does not make 
sense for the car manufacturer to immediately change 
technology to electric or hybrid cars (Liesenkötter and 
Schewe, 2013, p. 276). The vehicle manufacturers as the 
focal actors of the current automotive industry have 
their core competences in the design and production 
of combustion engines (Dietl, Royer and Beckmann, 
2013, p. 23). This means that they are somewhat locked 
into this bundle of resources specific to cars that need 
fuel and not electricity. These types of reactions imply 
changes on both the production-side and the demand-
side for companies.
Figure 33: Technological retreat
3: Source: Own figure.
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This reviewed body of literature focuses mainly on the 
innovation, marketing and/or strategy of old technolo-
gy-based companies reacting to technological change. 
An in depth analysis of how the companies underlying 
VCAs may change (or not) due to new technology still 
lacks in the literature. However, technological races and 
technological retreats have different and deep implica-
tions within and outside organisations. Firms have to 
develop new marketing, manufacturing and engineer-
ing capabilities despite they keep focusing on the old 
technology. The first concern is to develop these inter-
nally or by integration of new and necessary capabili-
ties. 
Referring to the internal development, acquisitions are 
a typical but risky way to coping with change by disrup-
tive technology and creating capabilities (Christensen, 
1997). A well-known example of such risks is the 1984 
acquisition of Rolm by IBM in the PC industry. The IBM 
mistake to push Rolm resources into its original large 
computer business destroyed a large part of the value 
of the acquired company in few years (Christensen, 
1997). Referring to the external environment, the usual 
reduction of the market size of old products entails the 
traditional economies of scale are not achievable any-
more by companies. Old technology firms must search 
for flexibility (Adner and Snow, 2010). The inclusion of 
new technology-based components in the old declining 
products should reduce, therefore, the extent of inte-
gration of the production process of retrofitted (im-
proved) old technological products.
A critical issue of old technology-based companies and 
their competitive advantage, thus, is to keep legitima-
cy in their business ecosystem (Adner and Snow, 2010). 
When a technology starts declining the firm has to 
face the issue of revising its set of suppliers. Many of 
them might decide to exit from the industry or switch 
to new technology. Companies performing technologi-
cal retreats, thus, should try to keep the best suppliers 
and redesign their VCA accordingly with the new com-
ponents. 
The repositioning of old technology products from 
mass to niche market could affect also the selection 
of distribution partners and channels. For instance, 
after the rise of quartz watches some firms manufac-
turing mechanical watches repositioned and sold their 
products by new distribution partners. General purpose 
technologies might introduce new technological com-
petencies and distribution channels or partners into 
the industry which affect old technology and its (retro-
fitted or not) products. For instance, the widespread of 
e-commerce pushed old technology firms in many in-
dustries to extend their VCAs by integrating reliable e-
commerce providers and global shipping companies. It 
can also be a possible move to establish own brick-and-
mortar-outlets to compensate for a decreasing num-
ber of attractive sales outlets in the market. Sellers of 
high end cutlery or porcelain may lose their established 
sales infrastructure due to the decline of certain types 
of shops for exclusive homeware or jewellery stores 
and follow the sketched avenue.
Conceptualising relevant elements of VCAs of 
old technology firms
After the discussion of relevant elements from the 
literature the further research process shall be fuelled 
with propositions which may be contrasted with reality 
in the course of future research. The aim of this pa-
per is to come to a sound conceptualisation of propo-
sitions about VCAs for providers of old technology on 
the chain of arguments developed from the literature. 
The propositions are elaborated with the explicit objec-
tive to develop them further towards testable hypoth-
eses. Therefore, next to a thorough description of the 
variables in the propositions, we want to sketch first 
concrete ideas for the operationalisation of these con-
structs.
From the literature on old-technology firms and value 
creation architectures we have derived several propo-
sitions: Building on the reasoning developed from the 
literature and showed above we deducted that two lev-
els of competition are relevant for our analysis, i.e. the 
competition between different VCAs (inter-architec-
ture competition) as well as the competition between 
the actors in the same VCA to appropriate a high share 
of the resulting rents within that particular system 
(intra-architecture competition) (see Dietl et al., 2009). 
Due to the specificities of old technology firms – as out-
lined above and using Adner and Snow’s (2010) consid-
erations as a point of reference – we in the first step of 
research propose to focus on inter-architecture compe-
tition as intra-architecture competition seems to play 
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a minor role due to the assumed decreasing number of 
suppliers and other potential partners in the VCA. 
When we want to understand value creation possibili-
ties for old-technology firms we suggest that we have 
to come to an understanding of the situation before 
and after the dominance of a superior new technology. 
Therefore the analysis of the process of technological 
change can be – similar to what is shown in Figure 1 
building on Adner and Snow (2010a) and Sandström 
(2013) - split into two relevant time periods: (1) time 
period 1 [tp1] as the time span when old-technology 
firms see their possibilities to realise rents threatened 
by the emergence of a superior technology, and (2) time 
period 2 [tp2] as the time span after new technology 
became dominant, some old-technology firms were 
forced to leave the market and only a smaller number 
of niche players competes on the basis of the old tech-
nology (see Figure 3 again). 
We assume that old-technology firms usually have 
to fight hard against also threatened old-technology 
competitors when a superior technology emerges in a 
market in tp1 when they are locked into the old tech-
nology product-market system and cannot switch to 
the new technology. This assumption is in line with 
Porter’s (2008, p. 85) understanding of a high intensity 
of rivalry in a given industry being pushed by fights of 
incumbents for market share in an environment char-
acterised by declining growth and exit barriers due to 
specific investments. Competition between the incum-
bents (and therewith between their VCAs) is fierce in 
this point in time since they all have a lot to lose and 
they are all due to their specific investment into the 
whole platform forced to fight hard or leave the mar-
ket with high investment ruins. They basically fight 
for their survival in a marketplace where the expected 
total rents to be gained are shrinking. This reasoning 
leads to the first proposition: 
Proposition 1: Old-technology firms focus on out-com-
peting other old technology-based rivals in tp1 so that 
a fierce (inter-architecture) rivalry between the incum-
bents comes into being.
However, from the perspective of an old-technology in-
cumbent the rivalry in tp1 is not limited to the other old-
technology competitors. Further, obviously the new-
technology firms are a major threat to profitability for 
an old-technology player as well. After reviewing the 
literature on old technologies and the strategic reac-
tions of race and retreat (e.g., Adner and Snow, 2010a; 
de Liso and Filatrella, 2008) a link between these two 
may be assumed: before a technology retreats in a 
niche market in tp2, it races with the new emerging 
technology and therewith improves (see Cooper and 
Schendel, 1976; Gilfillan, 1935; De Liso and Filatrella, 
2008 and 2011 for an elaboration of this sailing ship ef-
fect). It thus may be assumed that an old technology 
gets improved through the pressure of the introduction 
of a new technology (i.e., a race gets started):
Proposition 2: Old technology firms facing the intro-
duction of a superior technology into the market show 
a high level of product innovation in tp1.
Building on that chain of assumptions as well as the 
assumption that just companies with strong (however, 
locked-into the old technology) resources (e.g., patents 
and/or R&D capabilities) stay into the old technology 
market, we - on the basis of Adner and Snow’s (2010) 
considerations on retreat strategies- suggest the fol-
lowing: The old-technology firms with a high level of 
innovations in the first phase are also the later old-tech 
survivors in the second analysed phase. In this phase 
they then retrench into a market niche. Furthermore, 
we assume that they will gain significant market 
share/ importance in this specific niche as the number 
of players will be increasingly limited with the struc-
tural market changes. These assumptions are phrased 
in the following two propositions: 
Proposition 3a: Old technology firms with a high level 
of product innovation in tp1, are likely to survive in tp2.
Proposition 3b: Old technology firms with a high lev-
el of product innovation in tp1, follow differentiation 
strategies in tp2 and thereby retrench into strategic 
niche positions of the overall market.
On the basis of the VCA concept (Dietl et al. 2009) we 
suggest that old-technology firms which are successful 
in surviving the introduction of a superior technology 
into their markets face a situation which is character-
ised by a small number of competing niche players in 
the old-technology segment in tp2. By having retreat-
ed to a niche there is also a certain protection against 
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new-technology firms as well as against new entrants. 
Thus, we assume that the old-tech survivors usually lay 
respectively have to lay major focus on competitive ad-
vantage realisation inside the borders of their VCA. We 
suggest that old technology firms have to concentrate 
on their own resources and capabilities since the num-
ber of vertical and horizontal partners and competitors 
is declining with the decline of the old technology. Since 
their products can be characterised as niche products it 
can be assumed that old-technology based firms are 
more likely to compete in a relatively stable industry 
context once the number of other old-tech providers is 
relatively small. In such a market they are able to ap-
propriate value and build long-term competitive ad-
vantage with an integrated value creation architecture. 
From this reasoning a further proposition arises:
Proposition 4: Old-technology firms surviving the in-
troduction of a new technology build highly integrated 
value creation architectures for the old technology in 
tp2.
Furthermore, old technology firms in platform markets 
are usually locked-in to the old product, e.g. through 
resource allocation and path dependency as well as 
compatibility issues (see Arthur, 1989 for an elabora-
tion of the lock-in phenomenon). Old-tech companies 
may in addition find it hard to totally giving up the old 
technology due to economic as well as emotional lock-
ins. This may have the implication that they stick to 
the old technology, even when they make parallel ef-
forts to switch to the new technology, i.e. follow a dual 
strategy.
Proposition 5: Old-technology firms with sufficient re-
sources often follow a dual strategy with the old and 
the new technology after tp2.
Conclusions and implications for 
further research about VCAs in the 
vinyl market
Within this piece of research we focused an area which 
often is not regarded by scholars even though it is im-
portant and highly interesting: the area of old-technol-
ogy firms which survived and still operate today. We 
therefore reviewed the main literature about VCAs and 
the strategies of old technology-based companies af-
ter technological change. Based on these analyses we 
elaborated the following six propositions (see Table 1 
for a summary of the propositions) for further research 
in this area.
Table 14: Propositions about the structure and strategy of old-tech providers in platform markets
Proposition 1 Old-technology firms focus on out-competing other old 
technology-based rivals in tp1 so that a fierce (inter-ar-
chitecture) rivalry between the incumbents comes into 
being.
Proposition 2 Old technology firms facing the introduction of a su-
perior technology into the market show a high level of 
product innovation in tp1.
Proposition 3a Old technology firms with a high level of product inno-
vation in tp1, are likely to survive in tp2.
Proposition 3b Old technology firms with a high level of product inno-
vation in tp1, follow differentiation strategies in tp2 and 
thereby retrench into strategic niche positions of the 
overall market.
4: tp1 = time span when old-technology firms see their possibilities to realise rents threatened by the emergence of a superior technology; 
tp2 = time span after new technology became dominant and only a smaller number of niche players competes in old technology segment
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Proposition 4 Old-technology firms surviving the introduction of a 
new technology build highly integrated value creation 
architectures for the old technology in tp2
Proposition 5 Old-technology firms with sufficient resources often 
follow a dual strategy with the old and the new technol-
ogy after tp2.
Further research is needed to discuss these proposi-
tions and contrast them with the reality e.g. by ap-
plying a case study research strategy. We suggest the 
case of the vinyl industry in Europe to be a good exam-
ple and worth to study in-depth as it shows interesting 
market characteristics with its boom after many years 
of decline of sales. There still exists a good number of 
vinyl pressing companies with different degree of inte-
gration of their value creation architectures.
The next step in this research regarding VCAs in old 
technology context in our eyes thus has to be an em-
pirical investigation. A case study approach may be 
developed to contrast for instances our Proposition 4 
which suggests that a relatively integrated VCA would 
be beneficial in old technology markets with the reality. 
We plan to explore this in a case study where we ap-
ply the concept to analyse value creation architectures 
in the industry context of vinyl, focusing on the vinyl 
pressing businesses as the focal actors. 
Vinyl seems to be an attractive example to investigate: 
A vinyl revival occurred over the last ten years. Latest 
statistics report that the amount of vinyl purchased in 
the U.S. in 2012 reached 4.6 million units which is an in-
crease of 17.7% compared to 2011 (Nielsen, 2012). Even 
though 2014 was a bad year for the U.S. music industry 
overall, vinyl stayed a noteworthy trend with its 51.8% 
rise in sales compared to 2013 which means 9.2 million 
vinyl sales and 6% of all physical music sales. Compact 
disc sales on the other hand declined by 14.9%. (Niels-
en, 2015). Physical formats still account for more than 
half of all global revenues, vinyl here grows as a nice 
product (IFPI, 2014, p. 7).
The vinyl sales in the U.S. in 2012 accounted for 177 
million USD, while it was only 166 million USD in 1997 
(IFPI, 2013). One of the motivations explaining the cur-
rent purchase of vinyl by end-users and the current 
value creation in this industry lies in the fact that vi-
nyl became popular and trendy between young artists 
as well as music listeners (e.g., Pankinkis, 2012). The 
sound quality of vinyl is perceived to be much higher 
than of CDs or MP3s by these customers. Some labels 
or stores (e.g., Amazon) meanwhile offer to download 
the songs for free as MP3 when buying the vinyl album 
and therewith combine the best of both worlds. Anoth-
er motivation relates to the on-going use of turntables 
by some (vintage) communities of DJs (e.g., Schiavone, 
2013). When put in relation to the music market vi-
nyl album sales have accounted for 1.4% (2.3%) of all 
album sales (all physical album sales) (Hughes, 2013, 
p. 27). The market share documents that it is a niche 
market (Christman, 2013). Music companies foster this 
niche by producing a limited number of vinyl records as 
a deluxe product (James and Grogan, 2011, p.51). 
To analyse the theoretical approach in a real-life con-
text a multiple case design may be useful (Yin, 2003, 
p. 39). Case studies are a useful approach to illustrate 
general facts or theoretical concepts (Boos, 1992). They 
are an “[…] empirical inquiry that investigates a con-
temporary phenomenon within its real-life context 
[…]” (Yin, 2003, p. 13) and “copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data need-
ing to coverage in a triangulating fashion […]” (Yin, 
2003, pp. 13-14). 
We here suggest to use a cases study strategy further 
since the research subject in terms of the complex vari-
ables and the interdependencies between them can 
only be sufficiently analysed when data from different 
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sources are taken into account and in-depth interviews 
are conducted with industry experts which excludes 
analysing a large number of cases (Weber, Mayrhofer, 
Nienhüser, Rodehuth & Rüther, 1994, p. 55). We sug-
gest a nomothetic case study research design here to 
be able to actually contrast the propositions with the 
reality and thereby test them. Nomothetic in this con-
text refers to the fact that each of the cases of old tech 
players investigated in the vinyl market is to be clas-
sified on the basis of the theoretical considerations 
from the developed propositions. Data maybe collected 
with quantitative as well as qualitative methods which 
both can be useful. The aim of a hypotheses testing 
nomothetic case study lies in eliminating implausible 
hypotheses in a process of comparing them with the 
characteristics the variables show in the different cas-
es investigated (Fisch and Boos, 1987, p. 356; Weber et 
al., 1994, p. 51).
After setting up the propositions as an outcome of the 
theoretical discussion of the VCA of old-technology 
firms one tricky part therefore lies in operationalising 
the complex constructs used in the variables. We thus 
here want to come up with first ideas regarding the op-
erationalization of them with regard to a cases study 
research of different remaining players in the European 
vinyl market(see Table 2).
Within further research the propositions are to be test-
ed with the help of a case study analysis in the vinyl 
industry (or other fitting industry contexts). We think 
that it is fruitful to analyse the vinyl pressing indus-
try which in our view is a good example of an old-tech-
nology based industry which survived building a niche 
market for some players and even grows nowadays. As 
cases we would choose remaining players (respectively 
their VCAs) in the European vinyl market.
Limitations of our approach lie in the fact that so far 
we have no empirical data included. However, due to 
the complexity of the field we saw it as highly relevant 
to focus on a sound conceptualisation of propositions 
in the first step and test them in follow up studies.
The aim of this paper was to generate propositions re-
garding the companies’ value-adding activities in order 
to sustain an old platform or establish new platforms 
for old products in decline. Thereby we focus on a ne-
glected topic in the strategy literature which, however, 
bears relevance for many businesses locked into prod-
uct-market systems which make it hard for them to 
(completely) switch to a new technology emerging in 
the market. It is relevant to describe the consequences 
in a systematic fashion and this is what we did on the 
basis of the strategic literature used. In addition, we 
wanted to come to a deeper understanding of the re-
lationships between different elements in that context 
which led us to the formulation of the propositions 
summarised in Table 1. These are a good fundament for 
future research in this area as well as first insights into 
the constellations to be expected over time for old tech 
businesses in platform markets.
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Table 2: Avenues towards operationalising the relevant variables
Variables Time Possible measures
tp1 - - relevant time period suggested for 
the vinyl market 1981 – 1989
tp2 - - relevant time period suggested for 
the vinyl market 2006 – 2012
rivalry/ competition tp1 - price discounting (Porter, 2008, p. 
32)
- [number] of new product introduc-
tions (Porter, 2008, p. 32)
- [number] of advertising campaigns 
(Porter, 2008, p. 32)
- service improvements (Porter, 
2008, p. 32)
- industry growth in % (slow growth 
precipitates fights for market share; 
Porter, 2008: 32)
- industry decline in %
- [number] of relevant companies 
offering the product/ competitors
product innovation tp1 - [number] of old products revital-
ised; 
- [number] of new products devel-
oped;
- [number] of new patents
survival tp2 - [years] of existence (year of clo-
sure/ today minus founding year)
niche position tp2 - market share in overall market in 
[%]
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differentiation tp2 - focus on special sales [price level], 
e.g. high-end/ luxury, compared to 
new technology, quality focus
- [number] of distribution channels/ 
distribution partners
- [number] raising and creating el-
ements the industry has never of-
fered (Porter, 2008)
- Differences in [quality] which are 
usually accompanied by differences 
in [price]
- Differences in functional features 
or design
- Ignorance of buyers regarding the 
essential characteristics and quali-
ties of goods they are purchasing 
 [buyer behaviour]
- Sales promotion activities of sell-
ers and, in particular, advertising, 
e.g. [number] of campaigns
- Differences in availability (e.g., tim-
ing and location) (Sharp and Dawes, 
2001)
integration tp2 - Production depth: ideally [%] of in-
house processes compared to out-
sourced ones (production steps)
- Production control: duration in 
[years] and sustainability of rela-
tionships in [number] of suppliers 
(multiple sourcing vs. exclusive sup-
plier); [level] of location-specific in-
vestments (geographic proximity of 
supplier plants), integration of direct 
suppliers – focus on direct tier 1 sup-
plier 
- Distribution depth: ideally [%] of 
direct sales/ direct involvement and 
intervention compared to sales via 
third parties
- Distribution control: [type] of sales 
and contracts with dealers (e.g., 
franchise); [level] of specific invest-
ments at dealers – focus on relation-
ships with direct distributors
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